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Abstract 
The coexistence in EMU of one common monetary policy and several domestic fiscal
policies raises a number of problems of both academic and political interest. First,
there are reasons to assess a hypothetical need to also centralise fiscal policies in
such circumstances, according to what prevails in federal states. Second, given that
this hypothesis has not reached consensus in the EU, nor is it expected to do so in
the near future, the issue of how to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policies, in order 
to achieve the desired outcomes in both global and individual terms, arises. Third, the
fact that policy spill-overs are enhanced in the EMU, the need to avoid free riding 
behaviour on the part of member states and the apparent non-reliance on financial 
markets to discipline sovereign debtors led to the option of restricting the autonomy
of domestic fiscal policies by setting up constraints upon the relative levels of deficits
and debts.  
Due to these restrictions, it is important to investigate the existence of alternative 
options in case of economic shocks that are specific to an economic area, or that do
not equally affect all EMU members. Theory suggests that financial markets, when
integrated, can provide relief by supplying the means to finance recovery. However, 
the lack of integration, uncovered by empirical analyses especially in peripheral EU
areas, indicates that financial markets cannot be fully relied upon as mechanisms of
adjustment. 
The current study analyses these topics of interest for monetary and fiscal policies in 
EMU. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) is an unparalleled example in the current and past 
processes of international integration. Along with the plans of enlargement 
to Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), which will soon be 
concluded for ten candidates, in 1999 eleven member states entered what was 
designated as the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
EMU members significantly intensified existing economic links by 
implementing a monetary union on top of an already established common 
market. To this end, a voluntary substitution of domestic currencies by a 
common one took place and authority over monetary policies was formally 
transferred to a supranational institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). 
In spite of this decision, member states kept their political autonomy and 
maintained responsibility over the remaining macroeconomic policies.  
The common monetary policy, announced at the end of the 90s, is based on a 
2 per cent target for inflation. Such a restrictive policy stance, which is 
believed to be a way of assuring monetary stability in the integrated area, 
may in fact lead EU economies to deflation, with all the negative 
consequences that the situation involves. 
The monetary union was implemented in a space not completely 
homogeneous in economic terms, where a number of disparities are still 
evident. The improvements in terms of economic integration and the 
previous completion of the single market program did not fully abolish the 
gap between the rich core and the poor peripheral countries. Furthermore, 
the EU is also a heterogeneous space in social, cultural and political terms 
and such heterogeneity will be enhanced by the imminent Eastern 
enlargement. As a result, the probability of asymmetric disturbances has not 
diminished, as previously expected following an intensification of economic 
integration, and is still high, especially in the periphery of EMU. 
Having given up the ability to use instruments such as interest rates or 
exchange rates, which are capable of providing at least a short-term relief to 
areas hit by economic shocks, and without the possibility of relying on 
labour markets to this end, attention turns to alternative mechanisms capable 
of providing the stabilisation and adjustment of economies hit by specific   5 
disturbances. In spite of possible market adjustments, the focus is on 
domestic fiscal policies, given that monetary integration was not 
accompanied by fiscal centralisation, thus leaving budgetary instruments 
under the responsibility of individual member sates. 
However, the coexistence in EMU of one common monetary policy and 
several domestic fiscal policies raises a number of problems of both 
academic and political interest. First, there are reasons to assess a 
hypothetical need to also centralise fiscal policies in such circumstances, 
according to what prevails in federal states. Second, given that this 
hypothesis has not reached consensus in the EU, nor is it expected to do so 
in the near future, the issue of how to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal 
policies, in order to achieve the desired outcomes in both global and 
individual terms, arises. Third, the fact that policy spill-overs are enhanced 
in the EMU, the need to avoid free riding behaviour on the part of member 
states and the apparent non-reliance on financial markets to discipline 
sovereign debtors led to the option of restricting the autonomy of domestic 
fiscal policies by setting up constraints upon the relative levels of deficits 
and debts.  
Due to these restrictions, it is important to investigate the existence of 
alternative options in case of economic shocks that are specific to an 
economic area, or that do not equally affect all EMU members. Theory 
suggests that financial markets, when integrated, can provide relief by 
supplying the means to finance recovery. However, the lack of integration, 
uncovered by empirical analyses especially in peripheral EU areas, indicates 
that financial markets cannot be fully relied upon as mechanisms of 
adjustment. 
The current study analyses these topics of interest for monetary and fiscal 
policies in EMU and is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the common 
monetary policy, assessing the risks that it may imply for the involved 
economies. Section 3 deals with the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policies, and assesses economic arguments for and against fiscal 
centralisation, the need to co-ordinate independent fiscal policies, and the 
role of financial markets as alternative sources of stabilisation. Given the 
still prevalent fragmentation of EU financial markets, and therefore their   6 
inability to fully cope with the burden of adjustment and stabilisation, such 
tasks will also have to be performed with resource to national fiscal 
instruments if tensions that may jeopardise the future of the Community are 
to be avoided. For this reason it is of vital importance to assess whether 
domestic fiscal policies are sustainable for, if this is not the case, the 
stability, and eventually the survival, of EU are severely threatened. Such 
assessment is performed in section 4 with an empirical analysis of the 
sustainability of fiscal policies in both current and perspective EU members. 
 
2  The risk of deflation 
 
There is a general consensus that EMU has successfully managed to keep 
inflation rates, and inflation expectations, at a very low level, by recent 
historical standards. Inflation has receded in most EU countries since the 
early 1990s (Figure 1). The question now is whether this monetary policy 
path can prevent the threat of deflation and how it deals with it in case it 
occurs.  
“In the US, where the FED has made clear its concerns and has the freedom to act if it needs 
to, the risk of deflation seems relatively small. Countries that are explicitly committed through 
inflation targets to fighting deflation, such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand, are also 
likely to be less at risk. In Germany, where monetary policy is set by the ECB with reference 
to the eurozone economy as a whole and policymakers are more concerned about inflation than 
deflation, the risk looks greater” 
Financial Times, 03.01.2003 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.1  The optimal inflation rate 
The question of what is the optimal level of inflation has been discussed for 
a long time, but no definite answers have been found. To Friedman (1969), 
for example, the expected inflation rate should be negative on average and 
equal, in absolute value, to the real interest rate. Only then would the price, 
or opportunity cost, of money, the nominal interest rate, equal the marginal 
cost of producing money, in practice almost negligible. This is the 
microeconomic theory’s long run condition of producer optimum in perfect   7 
competition. To Feldstein (1996), for example, the monetary authorities’ 
objective should be to achieve zero inflation. 
In reality, all central banks presently agree with the objective of price 
stability for monetary policy. However, this objective has been differently 
quantified, implicitly assuming that price stability does not necessarily mean 
a traditionally measured inflation rate of zero. 
The European Central Bank, for example, explicitly aims at an inflation rate 
below 2%. The Fed, although it does not indicate a precise quantitative 
objective, seems to accept slightly higher values. Other countries, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK, have set inflation targets, 
either as a point or an interval, between 0 and 3 per cent. 
Why is the objective of price stability quantified in practice as a small but 
positive value? The problem is that the consumer price indices usually 
computed tend to over-estimate the real inflation rate, namely for failing to 
consider in some cases the quality bias, i.e., an increase in quality which 
increases prices, to pay for that extra quality, but should not be considered 
inflation. 
 
2.2  The deflation problem 
Most economic agents have persistent expectations that the normal state of 
the economy is of constant price increases, and consequently spending 
decisions are based on the assumption that prices can only go up. The 
possibility of a generalized price level reduction is not considered by most as 
a natural fact. The observation that prices in some sectors have dropped 
occasionally in the last few years comes as a surprise for most people. And in 
fact, for most living persons, price increases have been the norm during all 
their lives. In general, prices have been continuously increasing since the 
Second World War, although in the XIX century, and until the end of the 
gold standard, deflation episodes were frequent. In Portugal, for example, 
prices have always been growing during the last fifty years. Since 1953, prices 
have grown by more than 8000 per cent, an average inflation rate slightly 
above 9 per cent per year, rising to almost 13 per cent since 1970 (Figure 2). 
 
[Figure 2 about here]   8 
 
Finally, monetary authorities have managed to achieve and maintain low 
levels of inflation in most developed countries. The main doubt arising now 
is whether this successful fight against inflation may lead the economy to the 
opposite, but equally or even more harmful, phenomenon of deflation. 
The main problem with deflation is that it may engage countries in a spiral of 
economic decline. Expectations of deflation induce economic agents to 
postpone consumption, waiting for lower prices. It also may prevent agents 
from recurring to credit, fearing an increase in the real burden of debt. 
Deflation has a significant negative effect on debtors, for example those 
holding large mortgages. The reduction of demand causes prices to fall even 
further, namely as firms try to attract more clients. At the same time, 
deflation increases the real burden of corporate debt, triggering bankruptcies 
and investment cuts. Weak economic growth and increasing unemployment 
put pressure on further price cuts. 
On the other hand, price stability, strictu sensu, places two important 
problems on economic authorities. First, it becomes very difficult to achieve 
a reduction in real wages with the objective of, for example, reducing private 
consumption or unemployment. With a zero inflation rate, the reduction in 
real wages can only be attained by a reduction in nominal wages, which is 
more difficult to accept by workers, even in recession, than a comparative 
rise in nominal wages below inflation if money illusion phenomena persist. If 
labour markets do not clear, unemployment will rise. Akerloff et al. (1996) 
claim that with low inflation rates a trade off emerges between inflation and 
unemployment, the return of the Phillips curve. 
Second, price stability entails very low nominal interest rates. Fisher (1930) 
observed that an asset’s interest rate can not drop below zero if that asset 
can be stored without costs, as is the case of money (he exemplified with 
gold and wheat). No one will ever lend money at a negative nominal interest 
rate if it can be kept without loosing nominal value at zero inflation. 
There seems to be therefore a zero-bound on interest rates. And so what? 
Keynes (1936) was perhaps the first author to show some concern on the 
possible consequences for monetary policy of this zero-bound. With a zero 
nominal interest rate, money and bonds hold the same real interest rate (r=i-  9 
πe), and therefore economic agents will always prefer to keep their assets as 
money, more liquid and less risky. In this case, expansionary open-market 
operations, where the central bank buys public bonds (if there are any 
remaining, another question analysed above) and increases the monetary base 
(if there is any, as observed above) will not exert any effect. Economic 
agents reveal an infinite money demand elasticity and will hold the whole 
money increase thus turning monetary policy inefficient. This is the 
academically known phenomenon of the liquidity trap. 
The problem arises when an economy enters into recession, and monetary 
policy is not able, as before, to reduce the real interest rate in order to 
oppose it. With deflation, an increase in the real interest rate (r=i-πe) may 
even have perverse effects on demand and employment. 
However, in spite being studied in academic circles for many years, this 
question has been usually considered a mere curiosity with no applied 
interest, due to the expected scenario of high inflation and interest rates. 
Attention has been refocused on this subject in the last few years, as 
inflation and interest rates steadily diminished during the nineties. In a 
recent speech before the Economic Club of New York, Greenspan (2002) 
notes that “recent experience understandably has stimulated policymakers worldwide to 
refocus on deflation and its consequences, decades after dismissing it as a possibility so 
remote that it no longer warranted serious attention”. 
Being used to inflation for all their lives, economic agents keep inflation 
expectations, which prevents inflation from dropping further. Given the 
existence of persistence in inflation it may take some time for deflation 
expectations to arise. As those expectations slowly adapt, the possibilities of 
deflation increase. In Europe, the inflation rate, corrected for the quality 
bias, is below the already low official values. In China and other Asian 
countries, prices have fallen in several periods. In Japan (see figure 3), 
interest rates reached the zero-bound (in January 2003 overnight interest 
rates fell to negative values), and the Bank of Japan declared itself powerless 
to avoid the established depression. According to the Bank of Japan, the 
money stock, narrowly defined, increased 27.6 per cent in 2002 but prices 
continue to fall. The consequence was a decline in the Japanese average rate   10 
of economic growth from about 3.7 per cent between 1981 and 1992 to 1.4 
per cent between 1993 and 1997. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
2.3  Suggested solutions for the zero-bound 
Several solutions have been suggested to this problem of deflation and the 
zero-bound on interest rates.
1 One possible solution would be to avoid the 
problem altogether by establishing from the beginning higher long-term 
objectives for the inflation rate, with symmetrical intervals (Summers (1991 
and 1996), Fischer (1996) and Krugman (1996), for example, suggest three 
per cent). The first objection to this proposal arises from the difficulty in 
determining the ideal value for the inflation objective, which would depend 
primarily on the dimension of the economic recession. If the target is set too 
high, a more vigorous objection would certainly come from the increasingly 
independent central bankers, who do not renounce the promoted advantages 
of price stability. 
Alternatively, the problem could also be avoided if the inflation objective is 
replaced by an upward-sloping price level objective (Coulombe (1997), 
Gaspar and Smets (2000) and Svensson (2001)). Its advantage over an 
inflation objective is that a decline in prices would be expected to be 
followed by a rise in prices. The inflation expectations would reduce the ex 
ante real interest rate, allowing demand and employment to increase. With an 
inflation target, the price level is a nonstationary variable, whereas it 
becomes trend-stationary with an inflation target. The proponents of this 
solution claim that credible price level objectives reduce nominal interest 
rate variability, thereby reducing the probability of reaching the zero lower 
bound which constrains monetary authorities. 
A completely different approach, more imaginative and by many even 
considered surrealist, would be to impose a tax on money (Goodfriend 
(2000)). This tax would give back monetary authorities the ability to use 
                                                      
1 For a survey of some of these and other proposals see, for example, Goodfriend (2000).   11 
open-market operations to produce negative nominal interest rates, thereby 
reducing the real interest rate and avoiding recession. 
This tax could be applied to bank’s reserves, but also to coins and notes. To 
avoid paying the tax, economic agents would be willing to lend even at 
negative nominal interest rates. In this system, the lower bound of interest 
rates would be determined by the imposed tax rate. Whenever interest rates 
approached that limit, monetary authorities could adjust the tax rate to their 
objective for the interest rate. 
Although this idea is not recent, having been mentioned for example by 
Keynes (1936), it has not been seriously considered mainly due to the 
enormous administrative costs involved, and also because the question of the 
zero-bound has only recently re-emerged with the return of price stability. 
Recent technological developments, namely in payment systems, make this 
hypothesis less utopian. 
The tax on bank reserves would be relatively easy to set and to alter 
immediately whenever necessary. The tax on currency would have to be 
charged through a magnetic strip indicating the date of withdrawal from the 
banking system so that, when deposited, the value of the tax for the period 
in circulation could be deducted. With an annual tax rate of 3 per cent, for 
example, a fortnight in circulation would cost around 0.12 centimes for every 
euro deposited. 
Several criticisms have been raised on this tax. First, because it would be a 
regressive tax, in a system with very high production and administrative 
costs.  However, everyone has been, most times unconsciously, exposed to 
an also regressive ‘tax’ on money, the inflation tax, which affects money 
holders in quite the same manner as the tax presented above would. 
Furthermore, contrary to the inflation tax, the tax on money would only be 
imposed during short periods, whenever necessary. 
Second, because it would be very difficult for those economic agents highly 
dependent on capital income to be able to hedge themselves from a long 
period of negative nominal interest rates. Accordingly, Goodfriend (2000) 
also suggests using the tax together with open market purchases of long-term 
securities and monetary transfers, which would not affect interest rates but 
could stimulate spending by injecting liquidity into the economy. The   12 
problem is that these operations, and especially their reverse, necessary to 
remove excess liquidity and stabilise inflation after the economy recovers, 
would have a significant impact on public finances. On the one hand, the 
author suggests that the monetary transfers could take the form of a 
monetisation of budget deficits, which is formally forbidden in the EU. On 
the other hand, the government would have to indemnify the central bank for 
capital losses incurred for buying long-term securities at low interest rates 
and afterwards selling them back to the public at a lower price. 
The traditional Keynesian answer is to employ fiscal policy to pull economies 
out of recession. However, this solution is not very well regarded by the 
economic authorities who, for example in the EU, have even bound 
themselves to legislation renouncing the discretionary use of fiscal policies 
(e.g. the Treaty of Amsterdam). Besides, some countries are still facing very 
high values of public debt and deficits (see section 3), leaving little room for 
further expansionary fiscal policies. According to the Eurostat (2003) Japan, 
for example, presented in 2001 a deficit of 7.1 per cent of GDP (fuelled by 
high real interest rates) and a volume of public debt of above 130 per cent of 
GDP. The next section explores in more detail the possible interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies in EMU. 
 
3  The relationship between monetary and fiscal policies 
 
3.1  Is there a need for fiscal centralisation? 
Government budgets are responsible for the functions of resource allocation, 
income redistribution and economic stabilisation. As a consequence, much of 
the debate on the need of fiscal integration evolves around the question of 
whether these functions should be provided by national or by supranational 
authorities. In the past, most crucial decisions in the shaping of European 
integration were taken by political, rather than by economic motives. 
Although there are no reasons to believe that the decision making process 
will be substantially changed in the future, it is important to ascertain if the 
rationale for or against fiscal integration can be established in terms of 
economic efficiency. The researchers’ attention has been recurrently drawn 
to this issue, in the European and in other contexts. As Robson (1998)   13 
refers, theoretical assessments of the appropriate level of responsibility over 
fiscal instruments essentially consist of analysing the three budgetary 
functions on the light of three criteria: the existence of significant cross-
border spill-overs, of economies of scale and of political homogeneity.  
In the EU, and in most other market economies, the allocation function of 
domestic budgets is mainly directed to the supply of public goods such as 
defence, health and education, which are usually responsible for the majority 
of public expenses. Defence activities generate important externalities and 
economies of scale could be exploited by a provision at the EU level. On the 
contrary, in relation to health and education, not only are the spill-overs less 
important, but there also appears to be a lack of homogeneity in preferences 
across member states, thus suggesting that responsibility over these issues 
should remain national. 
The distribution function contributes to the spatial harmonisation of 
incomes and to the abolishment of economic disparities. It is particularly 
important in regions prevented from using some macroeconomic 
instruments, as is the case of members of a monetary union. In fact, the 
absence of redistribution mechanisms may submit economic blocs to social, 
political and economic tensions that may become unbearable if too extended 
in time. In purely theoretical terms, it is suggested that this function should 
be performed by the higher tiers of government, which in the case of the EU, 
would be the Community level. However, in the absence of a common 
budget, the transfers necessary to assure an efficient distribution function 
would have to be provided by the richer countries. Such a situation, if 
prolonged, is also unsustainable as it is not easily defensible upon those 
countries’ public opinion and is therefore prone to political exploitation. As 
a result, the distribution function is implemented mainly in the context of 
the EU regional policy. 
The existence of considerable externalities deriving from domestic fiscal 
policy actions is one of the most often cited arguments for the centralisation 
of fiscal policies in a context of integration. Another justification relates to 
the benefits of sharing the risks of random symmetric shocks (Goodhart and 
Smith, 1993). In fact, if such disturbances occur, member states may lack the 
incentive to take the appropriate measures, as part of their effort will be   14 
reflected in their partners’ economies, thus reducing the effectiveness of 
national fiscal procedures. In such circumstances a more adequate reaction 
would result from a centralised fiscal policy. 
This analysis produces arguments that are mostly in favour of a centralisation 
of fiscal policies in a context of economic integration. Moreover, such 
conclusion is reinforced in the particular case of monetary integration given 
that, in such context, the instruments available to provide economic 
adjustment and stabilisation following specific disturbances are scarce and 
the externalities of domestic policy measures are increased. Nevertheless, 
fiscal centralisation was not an option in EU. It has been considered that, 
even in cases of evident externalities, scale economies and political 
homogeneity, fiscal policy centralisation would be a solution only if the 
alternative hypotheses of policy co-ordination or policy harmonisation could 
not be envisaged (vide the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty). 
This was the case despite the fact that economic theory suggests that policy 
co-ordination or harmonisation are valid strategies only when the monitoring 
by involved parties is possible. If this is not the case, non-compliance could 
be the rational option, thus making the decision to centralise the most 
appropriate one. 
In spite of the many arguments for fiscal centralisation, it is also possible to 
find in the economic literature a rationale for the decisions of EU 
authorities. This is the case, for instance, of the work developed by Alesina, 
Angeloni and Etro (2001) who model an integrated group of countries and 
conclude that there appears to be a bias towards centralisation in small size 
unions, and vice versa. The authors uncover a trade off between the 
advantages of co-ordinating economic policies and the costs of lost 
autonomy, and deduce that such trade off determines the nature and the 
dimension of unions. In the light of these conclusions, it is expected that an 
already large union such as the EU, which will be further enlarged in the near 
future, would tend to be less (rather than more) centralised, thus reducing to 
a minimum the number of policies whose responsibility are to be transferred 
to a supranational level. 
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3.2  Coexistence of one monetary policy and many fiscal policies 
If a decision to form a monetary union in a group of economically integrated, 
but heterogeneous, economies is not accompanied by a centralisation of 
fiscal policies, the need for an independent use of domestic fiscal 
instruments is enhanced. However, a high degree of fiscal autonomy in a 
scenario of monetary integration poses a number of problems. It is therefore 
important to assess how free should governments be to manage fiscal 
policies according to domestic needs and how the different interests may be 
harmonised in order to achieve the acceptable results. 
Until the 70s it was believed that fiscal and monetary policies could be used 
to attain short and medium term objectives, such as the promotion of 
economic growth and the management of aggregate demand. While fiscal 
policy was considered to be the main responsible for the control of demand, 
monetary policy was directed to the promotion of growth and employment 
and, if necessary, also to the support of fiscal policy, for instance via the 
monetary financing of deficits. It was believed that this could be done 
without significant costs in terms of inflation and monetary stability.  
The reality suggested however that this paradigm was probably not correct 
and new theories emerged. The new approaches, which took into account the 
processes of private expectations’ formation and the objectives of political 
agents, indicated that instead of short-term discretionary strategies, directed 
to the macroeconomic fine tuning, the focus should be on the establishment 
of rules. These should be capable of providing long-term stability, via a 
consistent operation of monetary and fiscal policies, thus supplying an 
anchor for private expectations. 
In the EU, the main objective of monetary policy is price stability. The ECB 
was assigned a status of independence in order to be able to pursue this goal 
without the burden of political pressures. Since the common monetary policy 
is devoted to the maintenance of price stability, domestic authorities have 
fewer incentives to take into account the inflationary impacts of national 
policies, and also the consequences that such policies may have in terms of 
global financial stability and external equilibrium. This was considered in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which states the indispensability of an accurate co-
ordination of economic policies on the part of all member states and   16 
describes the institutional procedures recommended to this end. However, 
such reasoning is strictly applicable to the bigger economies only. In fact, 
although the common monetary policy is set for the whole of EMU, it is 
more aligned with the economic conditions of the bigger economies, and do 
not take into account the needs of smaller members. In turn, economic 
problems that may occur in the latter will have little or no effect upon the 
whole of the euro area and thus will not provoke a reaction on the part of 
the monetary authority (Hoeller, Giorno and Maisonneuve, 2002). 
In a macroeconomic model developed by von Hagen and Mundschenk (2002) 
the need to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union 
exists only in the short run. In the long run, these policies are independent 
and conflicts arise solely in shorter time spans. Such conflicts may also occur 
among independent fiscal authorities, whenever fiscal impulses are not 
costly, even if they pursue common economic objectives. It is also suggested 
that, in the assumption of central bank’s inflexibility in relation to the 
objective of maintaining price stability, co-ordination between fiscal policies 
is necessary to avoid excessive deficits. On the other hand, if the monetary 
authority decides to be less rigid at first, the final model equilibrium involves 
higher interest rates and larger deficits than in the case of central bank’s 
inflexibility. 
According to this study, with the ECB firmly devoted to the objective of 
price stability, the best common outcome for EMU would be obtained if 
member states co-ordinate domestic fiscal policies. However, instead of co-
ordination, the option was to restrict domestic fiscal autonomy by means of 
the constraints imposed upon public deficits and debts by the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The penalties that, under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure, may be inflicted to the non-compliant members 
are also in accordance with von Hagen and Mundschenk’s conclusions that 
point to the necessity of making fiscal impulses costly.  
As Uhlig (2002) refers, however, there are in the EU political incentives not 
to impose such penalties for the fear of disrupting ‘friendly political 
relationships’. The author therefore defends that the decision to penalise one 
country should not result from a discretionary decision, but instead be a 
consequence of well established automatic rules. The need for such   17 
automatic rules is reflected in the reactions of countries such as Germany 
and Portugal when warned by EU authorities of the need to correct their 
fiscal stance and tighten domestic fiscal policies. Whereas German 
authorities reacted and tried to water down the reprimands, the Portuguese 
government did its best to reduce the deficit to the recommended values, 
though with high costs in terms of growth and employment. Yet, the 
behaviour of the Portuguese authorities was only possible because a new 
government had just arrived into power and thus was in a position to take 
unpopular measures with minimum electoral consequences. 
Experience on this and on other areas indicates that bigger countries tend to 
be less responsive to peer pressure than smaller ones. Such conduct is much 
more hazardous given the fact that it is the actions of bigger countries, 
rather than those of smaller ones, that are critical to the economic 
performance of the whole euro area. Therefore, the apparent lack of 
responsiveness on the part of big member states is a further argument for 
establishing the automatic punishing procedures defended by Uhlig (2002). 
These would discipline all EMU members by effectively penalising non-
compliance with the restrictions imposed upon fiscal policies. 
 
3.3  Alternative adjustment mechanisms 
Although, as mentioned above, there are reasons to defend the reduction of 
autonomy over national fiscal policies in a monetary union, in the case of EU 
there is also a greater need for an independent use of domestic fiscal 
instruments, as member states’ economic heterogeneity makes them more 
prone to the occurrence of asymmetric disturbances. The scarcity of 
alternative mechanisms capable of promoting economic cushion following 
such disturbances makes independent fiscal reactions crucial. However, the 
notion that market forces cannot be relied upon to provide the fiscal 
discipline that is necessary in a monetary union when domestic fiscal policies 
are left unconstrained prevailed. Despite the no bail out compromise 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty, fiscal autonomy was restricted by the 
limits imposed upon the levels of public deficits and debts. Member states 
have thus to rely on financial markets to finance the adjustment of   18 
economies in the aftermath of idiosyncratic shocks. Yet, this solution is 
possible only if financial markets are fully integrated. 
The integration of financial markets requires both the absence of obstacles 
to the free flow of capital across borders and the perfect substitutability of 
assets issued in different political jurisdictions. A number of empirical 
analyses reveals the existence of high levels of integration among EU core 
financial markets, even before the establishment of EMU, but also exposes 
many deficiencies in terms of capital mobility and assets’ substitutability in 
the EU periphery (see, inter alia, Lemen, 1998). 
An assessment of financial integration between Portugal and Spain developed 
by Vieira (2000) shows that each of the two peripheral countries shares 
stronger links with Germany than with each other, in spite of the more 
intense economic relationships between the two. This study involves 
empirical tests performed with data on short-term assets only. It is 
nevertheless important to mention that, when the interest of the analysis is 
on the assessment of financial markets as mechanisms of economic 
adjustment and stabilisation, the focus should also be on long-term capital. 
In fact, if short term financial flows are capable of providing immediate 
relief following a shock, it is long term capital that permits the structural 
recovery that is need to re-establish economic structures. However, as the 
empirical literature suggests, signs of financial integration are always 
stronger in analyses performed with short-term data. Evidence of integration 
at the longer maturities is not found when it was not previously obtained for 
the short end of the maturity spectrum. 
Empirical analyses appear to suggest that financial markets can be relied 
upon to the end of stabilisation and adjustment precisely in the EU areas 
where such a mechanism is in theory less necessary. Given that a higher level 
of economic integration exists among core countries, these are in principle 
less prone to the occurrence of asymmetric disturbances. Peripheral regions, 
on the other hand, may be more in need of using financial markets as 
alternative mechanisms of adjustment, but they will probably find it more 
difficult to obtain the funds to recover their economies following a shock. In 
such conditions, and in spite of the strong limitations imposed upon them, 
fiscal instruments will probably also have to be used to help recovery. It is   19 
therefore essential that fiscal policies are sustainable for this is a condition 
to effectively use fiscal instruments to this end. 
 
4  The sustainability of fiscal policies in the EU and the  
accession countries 
 
The persistently large government deficits, and the resulting accumulation of 
debt in most developed countries since the mid seventies, raised significant 
concerns over the existence of long-run constraints on public borrowing, and 
the economic consequences of fiscal indiscipline. This has been one of the 
most controversial and discussed economic issues among academics and 
policymakers during the process towards EMU, and has now been revived 
with the plans for EU enlargement. 
The discussion over these questions is particularly important in a monetary 
union for several reasons. On the one hand, a deeper degree of economic and 
financial integration increases the probability that the effects of 
unsustainable fiscal policies in one country may spill-over to other member 
states, eventually threatening the stability of the whole union. On the other 
hand, the complete liberalisation of financial markets, and the elimination of 
exchange rate risk, increases the internal mobility of goods, services and 
production factors, raising spending and tax competition and hence 
restricting national fiscal flexibility. This may be particularly problematic for 
a highly indebted country, where a significant fraction of public revenues is 
permanently reserved to debt service, restricting considerably its capacity to 
implement stabilisation policies and provide sufficient public goods. This 
could further deteriorate the fiscal situation, by jeopardising growth 
prospects and diverting the tax base. 
Despite recent efforts towards fiscal consolidation in most EU and CEEC 
countries, complying with the Maastricht’s convergence criteria and the 
Amsterdam’s Stability and Growth Pact, expensive welfare programs and 
unfunded social security systems, together with an ageing population, can 
exert considerable strain on public finances over the next generations.   20 
The main objective of this section is to investigate whether current fiscal 
policies are sustainable, that is, able to guarantee the government’s solvency. 
This question is tested, for those countries where data is available, by 
examining the long-run univariate and multivariate stochastic properties of 
the fiscal variables, as implied by the intertemporal budget constraint. For 
the other countries, most CEEC, data restrictions do not allow the 
application of such methodology, but a careful observation of recent trends 
may give some insights on the state and prospects for public finances.  
 
4.1  Methodology and data 
Sustainable fiscal policies are here defined as those that can remain 
unchanged into the future without violating the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC). This long-run constraint is basically an accounting 
identity requiring the outstanding stock of debt to be completely offset by 
the expected, in present value, sum of all future primary surpluses and money 
creation. This requires the complementary restriction that the discounted 
value of the debt-GDP ratio must equal zero in the limit. With the variables 
represented as ratios to GDP: 
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where ρt is the real interest rate net of output growth ψ, with mean ρ, and dt 
is the interest bearing real public debt outstanding at the end of the period. 
The variables gt and tt represent, respectively, real primary government 
expenditures,  i.e., excluding interest payments on the public debt and real 
primary government revenues, excluding seigniorage. gt
*  is computed as 
gt+(ρt-ρ)dt-1, and mt is the monetary base. This presentation in ratios to GDP 
is consistent with the usual indicators employed to evaluate the performance 
of fiscal policies, and removes from the tests potential effects of 
nonstationarity in inflation and real GDP growth   21 
Several distinctive testing procedures have been proposed to investigate this 
long-term notion of fiscal policy sustainability with a transversality 
condition. Since the sustainability condition is interpreted as a long run 
relationship, it suggests the use of methodologies derived from the unit root 
and cointegration literature to test it empirically. The methodology adopted 
below follows the approach suggested in Hakkio and Rush (1991). 
After some mathematical manipulation of equation (1), the following 
expression can be obtained 
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where tgt represents total government expenditures (gt + ρdt-1) and ttt stands 
for total government revenues {tt and mt+mt-1/[(1+π)(1+ψt)]} ,  a s  r a t i o s  o f  
GDP. 
All the variables on the right-hand side of equation (3) are expressed in first 
differences. If all these series in first differences are stationary, i.e., if all the 
variables in levels are I(1), the right-hand side of (3) is stationary. This 
implies that the left-hand side, the global deficit, must also be stationary. 
Since tgt and ttt are, by the previous assumption, integrated of order one, they 
must therefore be cointegrated. 
The unit root tests will employ the widely used augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) methodology, with the lag length chosen by the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC). The hypothesis of cointegration will be tested using the 
procedure developed by Johansen (1988) and applied in Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) of maximum likelihood tests, which are based on the 
multivariate general representation of the vector error-correction model. 
Both alternative test statistics, known as the ‘Trace’ and the ‘Maximum-
eigenvalue’ statistics, will be computed. The latter tests the null hypothesis 
of, at most, r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of exactly r+1, 
while the former tests for, at most, r cointegrating vectors against an 
alternative of, at least, r+1 vectors. 
The choice of which and how the deterministic terms are included in the 
model is a nontrivial issue, and may have considerable influence on the final   22 
conclusions of the tests (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). Given the 
characteristics of the variables involved, the tests will be predominantly 
performed in a model with a constant term in the cointegrating vector and no 
other deterministic elements. 
The tests will be performed on all countries for which a sufficient period can 
be analysed. The data set is taken from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics, and considers annual data for the central government. Annual data 
allows the use of a longer time span, more powerful tests, and avoids 
problems of seasonality. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Observing the data, we find clear signs of fiscal retrenchment in the last few 
years (Figures 1 and 2) . The problem is that some of these fiscal adjustments 
may involve only temporary effects on the measures of the deficit and debt. 
An improvement of the budget accounts just before EMU through a wave of 
privatisations as in France, or a cut in public investment as in Germany, for 
example, has an immediate effect of fiscal retrenchment, without the 
potential political costs of a tax increase or a reduction of public current 
expenditures. However, these decisions may yield merely a temporary effect 
on the deficit, if the expected net returns from those privatised assets or 
from the curtailed investments exceed, respectively, their sale-value and 
initial cost. 
 
4.2  Testing long-run sustainability 
Table 1 displays the univariate stochastic properties of the main budget 
variables, with a special emphasis on the total surplus. The unit root tests on 
the series of total revenues and expenditures may provide earlier indications 
of the fiscal situation in some countries, but are intended mainly as a pre-test 
for the cointegration analysis. The test on the total surplus, however, 
provides a more direct indication of sustainability and stability of the debt 
ratio.   23 
 
[table 1 about here] 
 
The empirical evidence on table 1 suggests that all series of total revenues 
and total expenditures are integrated of first order.
2 Before proceeding to the 
cointegration analysis, a first direct test of sustainability can be performed. A 
sufficient, but not strictly necessary condition is the stationarity of the series 
of total surplus. Besides testing sustainability, this condition also examines 
whether the ratio of debt-to-GDP will grow without bound. The results are 
shown on the last column of the above table. 
The unit root tests more or less strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity of the total surplus in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (at the 10% level) and the UK. In 
the particular case of the Iberian countries, although the time period 
available is relatively smaller, the results clearly suggest unsustainability. This 
is certainly due to the very large imbalances incurred by both countries 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The situation has gradually improved, although 
the Council of the EU has recently (November 2002) issued a 
Recommendation against Portugal in the framework of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (article 104.7 of the Treaty). 
In January 2003, a Recommendation has also been issued to Germany and an 
Early Warning to France. The fact that both countries have been found in the 
tests above to follow sustainable fiscal policies suggests that the European 
authorities are more concerned with short-term values than with long-run 
trends. 
The robustness of the above conclusions derived from the unit root tests on 
the budget surplus may be evaluated with a cointegration test between total 
revenues and expenditures. Table 2 presents the results of the Johansen 
testing procedure. The model employed in the tests includes a constant in the 
cointegrating vector and no other deterministic terms. The order of the VAR 
(in parenthesis) has been chosen according to the indication of the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC).   24 
 
[table 2 about here] 
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, reinforcing the results obtained 
above. For Finland, France and the United Kingdom no evidence of 
cointegration was found and therefore the final results are not conclusive, 
requiring further econometric and data analysis. For all other countries, the 
evidence strongly suggests unsustainable fiscal policies and therefore the 
need for further fiscal corrections. This is the case of Portugal and Spain for 
example, which have recently followed similar paths in terms of deficits and 
debt (Figure 5). 
 
4.3  The CEEC’ fiscal situation 
Except for Hungary and Romania, data is not available for a long-run 
analysis in all other CEEC. Besides lacking a sufficiently long data series, 
fiscal variables in these countries reveal large fluctuations and significant 
structural breaks, especially in Bulgaria.  
Observing the evolution of the deficit/surplus as a ratio to GDP (figure 4), 
it appears that the series seem to converge to equilibrium in the last years of 
the sample. The prospects of accession and the conditions of fiscal 
consolidation seem to have significantly reduced budget deficits. A more 
careful analysis, however, suggests different patterns. The Czech Republic, 
for example, has been presenting progressively higher deficits since the mid 
1990s, the Slovak Republic displays the largest deficit at the end of the 
period considered (3.7 per cent of GDP), and Hungary also presents a 
relatively high deficit in 2001 (2.9 per cent), but improving from 6.3 per cent 
of GDP in 1998. On the other extreme, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia and 
Poland display fiscal surpluses in the last year for which data is available. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2 The tests on the first-differenced series, not shown, unanimously rejected the null of nonstationarity, excluding 
the hypothesis of higher orders of integration.   25 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Figure 6 displays the positions of the current and incoming member 
countries in a debt/deficit chart for 2001, the latest year for which data is 
available for all these countries. The values are not directly comparable with 
the previous data set since they refer to the general government and 
therefore include for example the social security accounts, an important 
element in many countries. Most CEEC are concentrated in the lower left 
part of the chart, presenting higher deficits but lower debt ratios. The lower 
the debt ratio, the lower the share of the budget allocated to the debt service 
and therefore the less difficult it is to reduce the deficit. Current EU 
members appear mostly in the top half of the chart, burdened with high 
public debts, and some in the lower right, a clear sign of fiscal discipline.  
 
4.4 Final  remarks 
Although a long-term analysis reveals some unsustainability issues, the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s extremely restrictive provisions may be sufficient 
to prevent major future fiscal problems both in the current and in the 
prospective EU members. Even the deteriorating fiscal conditions in recent 
years in some EU countries, such as Portugal, seem to be mainly due to the 
economic recession, and have raised doubts, even from the European 
Commission’s president, on the desirability of maintaining the strong 
restrictions of the Pact in these declining economic conditions. 
For those CEEC for which data restrictions do not allow a long-run analysis, 
no major problems can be identified from a visual inspection of the fiscal 
variables. One factor benefiting these countries is the fact that they do not 
hold a very high debt to GDP ratio, comparatively to some EU countries, 
where public debts above GDP have been observed in Italy, Greece and 
Belgium. Within the CEEC, only Bulgaria presented a debt ratio above 60 per 
cent in 2001 (figure 4). A very high debt ratio implies that a large share of 
the public revenues must be reserved for debt service, reducing the 
autonomy of the fiscal policy to react to the business cycle.   26 
The most serious threat to fiscal stability in all the European countries is the 
predicted changes in their demographic structures. A rapidly ageing 
population will increase the fiscal burden, through the welfare and health 
systems. Dependency ratios will, on average, double in the next fifty years 
(table 3). The situation will be particularly problematic in the Southern 
European countries, notably in Spain where the dependency ratio is expected 
to reach 73.8 in 2050. 
The population in the CEEC is, on average, relatively younger than the EU’s 
average, which could postpone all the fiscal problems related to the social 
security funds and welfare programs. However, according to the United 
Nations’ projections, population in the CEEC is ageing faster. By 2050, the 
median age will be above that of the current EU members (table 3). 
Recognizing that “long-term fiscal sustainability is a major issue in many EU 
Member States” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 7), the 
European Commission recently issued a report addressing the problem faced 
by pension systems. According to the report, public expenditures on 
pensions will increase, on average in the EU members, from 10.4 per cent of 
GDP in 2000 to 13.3 per cent by 2050, with the effects starting within the 
next decade. 
EU governments are now facing the important challenge of ensuring the 
sustainability of their welfare systems. Fiscal policies must be implemented 
to reduce the current debt burden and to modernise the pension systems. At 
the same time, economic polices aimed at increasing productivity and 
employment are also required. 
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Table 1: Unit root tests 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 
Country 
sample 
period  total revenues  total expenditures  budget balance 






































































































Notes: The lag length is chosen according to the ‘Schwarz Bayesian Criterion’. In parenthesis is the 
number of lagged differenced terms used in the regression (in all ADF tests the maximum lag length 
considered was four). The asterisks (**) indicate rejection of the null of nonstationarity at the 5 




Table 2: Cointegration tests 
  λ λ λ λ max  Trace 
  r=0   r<=1  r=0   r<=1 
Austria  17,0844  2,1116          19,1960       2,1116         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Belgium  5,4005      2,8826       8,2831        2,8826   
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Denmark  15,7881       6,1452          21,9333           6,1452        
  (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Finland  13,4806       1,5562          15,0368           1,5562  
  (2) (2) (2) (2) 
France   10,6394          4,1475           14,7869        4,1475        
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Germany  19,6508            9,4210          29,0718           9,4210        
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Greece  11,8436 2,6677 14,5112 2.6677 
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Hungary  6,8596           1,8632          8,7228            1,8632         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Ireland  6,6257            2,7869          9,4126            2,7869        
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Italy  10,7304            1,4950         12,2254           1,4950         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Luxembourg  19,3684           3,7413          23,1096            3,7413        
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Netherlands  17,3428           1,3833          18,7261           1,3833         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Portugal  5,9909            3,3013          9,2922             3,3013        
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Romania  11,5664           2,1166          13,6830           2,1166         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Spain   6,6434           3,1209           9,7643           3,1209         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Sweden  10,3099            3,6817          13,9916          3,6817         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
United Kingdom  8,9430            2,1975          11,1405           2,1975         
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
In parenthesis is the order of the VAR. The asterisks (**) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration at the 5% level of significance. Critical values (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1997): 
15.87/20.18 (5%) and 13.81/17.88 (10%) for the λmax/Trace tests and the null hypothesis of r=0, 
and 9.16 (5%) and 7.53 (10%) for both tests of r≤1. 
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Table 3: Median age and dependency ratios – 2000-2050 
   Median age (years)  Old-age dependency ratio* 
   2000 2050  change  (%)  2000 2050  change  (%) 
Luxembourg  37.7 40.0  6.1  21.5 31.4  46.0 
Ireland  31.9 40.5  27.0  16.9 37.2  120.1 
Denmark  38.7 46.5  20.2  22.5 43.8  94.7 
Netherlands  37.7 46.9  24.4  20.1 45.0  123.9 
France  37.6 45.2  20.2  24.5 46.7  90.6 
United  Kingdom  37.7 47.4  25.7  24.1 47.3  96.3 
Finland  39.4 47.7  21.1  22.3 48.8  118.8 
Belgium  39.1 48.7  24.6  25.9 51.2  97.7 
Portugal  37.0 48.6  31.4  23.1 53.5  131.6 
Sweden  39.7 51.2  29.0  27.1 54.5  101.1 
Germany  40.1 50.9  26.9  24.1 54.7  127.0 
Austria  38.4 53.7  39.8  22.9 62.5  172.9 
Greece  39.1 52.3  33.8  26.0 64.6  148.5 
Italy  40.2 54.1  34.6  26.7 68.1  155.1 
Spain  37.7 55.2  46.4  24.8 73.8  197.6 
Romania  34.6 46.7  35.0  19.4 44.6  129.9 
Estonia  37.3 47.9  28.4  21.2 46.8  120.8 
Poland  35.2 48.0  36.4  17.7 49.5  179.7 
Latvia  37.8 49.8  31.7  21.8 49.6  127.5 
Slovak  Republic  34.0 50.2  47.6  16.5 49.8  201.8 
Lithuania  35.7 50.6  41.7  19.9 51.0  156.3 
Hungary  38.1 49.8  30.7  21.4 51.2  139.3 
Bulgaria  39.1 51.3  31.2  23.7 53.7  126.6 
Czech  Republic  37.6 52.4  39.4  19.8 60.8  207.1 
Slovenia  38.1 54.1  42.0  19.8 65.9  232.8 
Note: *Number of individuals aged 65 and over per one hundred individuals aged 15-64.       
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ Money market rate (Spain)
Inflation rate (Spain)
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿Money market rate (Japan)
Inflation rate (Japan)
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF   35 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 
 
Figure 6: General Government Consolidated Gross Debt and Deficit/ Surplus (% of 












































Source: European Commission (2002a), European Commission (2002b) Eurostat (2002 and 2003). 
 